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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Section 1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES-RESEARCH GAP-RESEARCH MODEL 
Asymmetric information is a popular research topic due to its existence in most aspects in 
economies. A great deal of recent research and empirical study of this topic have focused on insider 
trading issues, manipulating price, information omission violations occurring extensively in both 
developed (US, Japan, Britain…) and emerging stock exchanges (Malaysia, China, Thailand…). 
Unfortunately, the research of this topic is still very limited on Vietnamese stock exchange. This can 
be explained with the fact that Vietnam stock market is newly established and thin-trading emerging 
market with a history of only ten years. However, with its rapid development and substantial 
contribution to Vietnam economy in recent years, issues evolving in Vietnamese stock market 
deserve to be researched and addressed in academic as well as practical forum.  
 
This paper is conducted based on empirical evidence from the previous study that 
asymmetric information level on Hochiminh Stock Exchange (―HOSE‖) is four times higher than 
that on NYSE (Nguyen Trong Hoai, Le An Khang, 2008) and HOSE is a thin-trading market, which 
is not efficient in weak-form of Market Efficiency Hypothesis (Truong Dong Loc, Ger Lanjouw, and 
Robert Lensink, 2010). The purposes of this research are (1) exploring main causes of severe 
asymmetric information, and rising of insider trading problem on Vietnamese stock market, (2) 
learning current strategic and effective solutions experiencing on other developed stock markets in 
the world and (3) recommending appropriate and necessary policies that can be best applied to 
Vietnamese stock market to minimize asymmetric information. Achievement of these objectives to 
some extent would help to reduce insider trading violations and other unlawful transactions and to 
ensure the fair trading on Vietnamese securities market (Kazumi Okamura, Chieko Takeshita, Laws 
and Regulations Relating to Insider Trading in Japan, 01
st
 edition, 40-76, 1989). For this reason, this 
research targets Vietnamese securities law makers and stock market controlling agent- The State 
Securities Commission of Vietnam (―SSC‖).  
 2 
According to Luu Tien Thuan and Chung Yuan
1
 and Chang, Hsu-Ling and Su, Chi-Wei 
(2010), the fluctuation of securities exchanges in US, Japan and Singapore have a ―positive and 
strong significant influence‖ on Vietnam Index in recent years. Additionally, long history of 
development of securities markets in the U.S and Japan have made those two markets being the  
most transparent exchanges with relatively better regulation system on disclosure information and 
insider trading monitoring. Besides, after reviewing regulations on stock markets of other countries 
such as France, Britain, Germany, and Ireland, I have found a few effective and practical solutions 
for similar problems (insider trading, price manipulation, misinformation violations…), which I 
believe can be applied to Vietnam situation. With these reasons, I have chosen those stock markets 
for my comparative analysis. My research model includes three main stages:   
(1) Figuring out Vietnam stock market severe problems 
(2) Exploring causes of these problems 
(3) Researching effective solutions applied in developed markets  
 (4) Comparatively analyzing Vietnam stock market and those mentioned and finally 
recommending the most proper and applicable solutions. 
 
A survey has also been conducted with the purpose to explore how serious asymmetric 
information is in Vietnamese securities market. Main method utilized in this research is 
―comparative approach‖ since it allows ―regulatory authorities to tailor regulatory reform and to 
review the different regulatory regimes‖ (Harry Mc Vea, 1993). However, this method also has 
disadvantage of leaving potential room for further debates. 
  
                                                        
1 Luu Tien Thuan and Chung Yuan
1
 in ‗The relationship between the United States and Vietnam 
stock markets‘, The International Journal of Business and Finance Research, Volume 5, Number 1 
 3 
                               
 
 
 
 
stage 1                   stage 2                    stage 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prohibition and stricter regulations imposing on these issues are both criticized and 
supported by many researchers. My literature review focused on 2 main categories: theoretical 
research and empirical study. Henry Manne (1966) is the ―most widely quoted” well-known critic of 
strict regulation on insider trading (James R. Marsden and Y. Alex Tung, 1999). Manne supported for 
the existence of insider trading. His positive opinion on insider trading can be summarized into three 
key points (James R. Marsden and Y. Alex Tung, 1999): 
“- Insider trading it is an effective way to encourage entrepreneurial activities since it can 
provide a meaningful form of compensation in large corporations”  
- Insider trading helps security prices adjust more rapidly to reflect underlying 
information, ; and, outsider investors are helped by the price changes brought about by insider 
trading and the losers are mainly short-term speculators 
- Insider trading does no harm to outsiders.”  
Marsden and Alex Tung (1999) supported his 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 points based on results received 
from their laboratory experiments. The results of their second experiment concluded ―the fast 
Comparative studies 
among Vietnam and others 
 
Vietnam stock 
market 
problems 
 
 
Explored causes 
of those 
problems 
 
Choosing most applicable solutions for Vietnamese securities market 
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dissemination of insider information indicating high market efficiency; and no significant difference 
between insiders' and outsiders' profits on insider information assets”.  
Yet, Manove, M. (1989) significantly opposed Manne‘s argument by the evidence that: 
 ―- Insider trading is not a cost-effective mechanism for promoting market efficiency and is 
no more effective than other compensation plans at producing the right incentive for entrepreneurial 
managers; informed insiders do earn excess profits from their trading 
 - Liquidity of markets will be reduced when insider trading is permitted; 
 -The inside information was intended for the benefit of the firm but not the private 
advantage of the traders; and, 
 - Outside investors will invest less because the market is unfair” (James R. Marsden and Y. 
Alex Tung, 1999)
2
 
Other researchers Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann (1994), Jacqueline (1989), 
Kazumi Okamura and Chieko Takeshita (1989), Raymond P.H. Fishe and Michel A. Robe (2003) did 
not directly opposed Manne‘ positive opinion; yet they exceptionally supported for the imposing of 
stricter regulations on insider trading activities and other related violations (price manipulation, 
information omission, misinformation…) including heavier penalties. 
 
Fishe and Robe (2003) confirmed that insider trading had a negative impact on stock market 
liquidity. According to Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, insider trading would erode 
investors‘ confidence on the market; and a lack of comprehensive insider trading regulation system 
could damage the reputation of any stock market. For these reasons, solving (or at least reducing) 
insider trading violations problem required the law to be improved in regard to penalties and 
enforcement at national level, in which penalties should be both an imprisonment and a fine. 
Kazumi Okamura and Chieko Takeshita (1989) also proved that in order to guarantee for the fairness 
of the securities market, Japanese law makers promulgated insider trading conduct subject to 
                                                        
2 See James R. Marsden and Y. Alex Tung, ‗The Use of Information System Technology to Develop 
Tests on Insider Trading and Asymmetric Information‘, Management Science, Aug99, Vol. 45 Issue 8, 
p1025-1040, 16p, 9 Charts 
 5 
criminal sanction. Additionally, Jacqueline (1989) and Harry Mc Vea (1993) supported for an 
application of Chinese Wall as ―one legal and economic regulatory technique and a key mechanism 
for regulating conflicts in multifunctional financial firms” and more advanced disclosure 
information requirements as a mechanism to reduce extensive information gap between informed 
and uninformed investors.
3
 
                                                        
3 See Jacqueline A.C. Suter BA, LLM, The regulation of Insider Dealing in Britain, Butterworths London 
& Edinburgh, 1989; and Harry Mc Vea, Financial Conglomerates and the Chinese Wall, Clarendon Press. 
Oxford, 1993 
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CHAPTER 2. VIETNAMESE STOCK EXCHANGE- HISTORICAL 
REVIEW- CURRENT EXCEPTIONAL PROBLEMS- 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
  
Section 1. HISTORY OF VIETNAM STOCK MARKET- FROM ITS FIRST DAYS OF 
ESTABLISHMENT JULY 2000 TO 2005 
Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (―HOSE‖), the main stock market in the country, was 
established in July 2000 under its former name Securities Trading Center (―HoSTC‖). HOSE is 
operated and regulated under the control of The State Securities Commission of Vietnam (―SSC‖), 
which is structured and managed by the Vietnam Ministry of Finance. SSC is responsible for the 
organization, development and supervision of Vietnam securities market. 
 
There were only two companies listed on HOSE on its first days of establishment: 
Refrigeration Electrical Engineering Joint Stock Corporation (‗REE‘) and Saigon Cable and 
Telecommunication Material Joint Stock Company (‗SAM‘) and its initial index started at 100 points. 
Figure 01 below shows that VNIndex (Vietnam Index) increased suddenly from 100 points to record 
high of 571.04 on 25 June 2001, which can be explained by the imbalance of supply and demand of 
stocks at that point of time. 
 
It took HOSE five long years to increase slowly its listed members from 02 companies in July 
2000 to 32 companies at the end of year 2005; however, the market capitalization
4
 grew 
significantly- by 14 times- from VND 1,048 billion (about USD 65.55 million) in 2000 to VND 
6,337 million (about USD 393 million) in 2005. Market capitalization accounted for a small part of 
Vietnam GDP at 0.24 percent in 2000 to 1.21 percent in early 2005. All of listed companies at this 
point of time were former state-owned companies. During these years, Vietnam Stock Index 
                                                        
4
 Market capitalization was calculated based on the closing price of stocks on 31st December 2005 
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(VNIndex) had been unstably fluctuated in the range between 100 points and 600 points. With a tiny 
number of stocks on the market, trading activity was not active and investors still hesitated to invest 
in a totally new market. The average daily trading value had been in a considerably modest range 
from USD 0.09 million (2000) to USD 6.8 million (2005)
5
. However, since then to the end of 2005, 
VNIndex dropped as quickly and instantly as when it rose up. 
 
Besides, as of December 2005, only 13 securities companies were licensed with their main 
services of brokerage, securities investment portfolio management, underwriting, and pop-trading
6
. 
Depending on type of securities services, a securities company will be required to meet a certain 
level of registered capital.   
 
Since the market was still newly born, regulation framework applied in stock market had not 
been constructed completely. In November 2003, the Decree 144 as a general guide for stock market 
was launched.  
 
Figure 01. Key development indicators for the STC over the period 2000–2005 
 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of listed companies 5 10 20 23 26 32 
Market capitalization (bil. VND) 1048.76 1661.1 2650.2 2514.29 3945.31 6337.48 
Market capitalization on GDP (%) 0.24 0.34 0.49 0.42 0.55  na 
Yearly trading value (bil. VND) 91.40  925.38 762.77 422.50  1692.99 2435.64 
Trading value on GDP (%) 0.02 0.19 0.14 0.07 0.24  na 
Average daily trading value 
 (bil. VND) 
1.39 6.13 3.23 1.71 6.8 9.82 
Source: Dong Loc, Truong, Lanjouw, Ger and Lensink, Robert (2010) 
'Stock-market efficiency in thin-trading markets: the case of the Vietnamese stock market', 
Applied Economics, 42: 27, 3519 — 3532, First published on: 15, December 2008 (iFirst) 
Section 2. FROM ITS RECORD PEAK IN 2006 TO PRE- GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
2007  
Dramatically had the situation changed at the end of year 2006 to March 2007 when VNIndex 
                                                        
5
 Exchange rate was calculated at 1USD = 16,000 VND 
6
 Trading on securities companies‘ accounts 
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plummeted significantly and reached its record peak at 1,170 point. The number of listed companies 
grew to 138 companies (end 2007). At the same time, number of securities companies also increased 
to 61 companies, triple of that in 2006 (Stock Magazine, 24
th
 October 2007). Trading activity was 
more active than ever. The average daily trading jumped to VND 401.84 billion (USD 27.5 million) 
(2006) and VND 1,562 billion (USD 110 million, 2007)
7
. Compared these figures with those in 2005, 
we can see Vietnam stock market had made a significant step forward in growing. If in 2004, market 
capitalization of HOSE accounted for only 0.55 percent of Vietnam GDP, that in 2007 (VND 
361,000 billion) accounted for 43% of Vietnam GDP. Vietnam stock market was mentioned in 
almost all newspaper locally and globally with the most beautiful words. The International Monetary 
Fund‘s chief economist Raghuram Rajan calls it an ―emerging China‖. Citigroup calls it ―the New 
Powerhouse of Southeast Asia‖. And Bloomberg cited that ―Vietnamese stocks are Asia's best 
performers this year (2006)‖. One of the reasons behind this rise is the issue of Vietnam‘s entry into 
World Trade Organization (WTO) this year (2006).  
 
However, simultaneously, Vietnam stock exchange‘s technology and transaction mechanisms 
had not been invested and developed to meet the demand of investors, especially when the stock 
market reached its peak in 2006 and early 2007 and was filled with a numerous amount of orders 
from investors. From 08
th
 December 2006 to 30
th
 August 2007, there were four typical trading cases 
occurring during transaction periods showing the trading system‘s limit: on the 08
th
 December 2006, 
investors could not access SEC‘s electronic boards; on the 26
th
 January 2007, one stock‘s price 
appeared twice on the electronic board; on the 02
nd
 February 2007, the daily morning trading periods 
were canceled to move to the afternoon; and on the 30
th
 August 2007, the electric board got frozen 
from 8:30 AM to 9:15 AM.  
  
Maximal number of shares holding by foreign investors (both individuals and institution) in a 
listed company is limited at 49 percent of its chartered capital; but in case of banks and other 
restricted companies, this number is lower at 30 percent. Demand of stocks in this period had been 
                                                        
7
 Own calculation on basis of data obtained from Hochiminh Stock Exchange Website at 
www.hsx.vn  
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always excessively more significant than the supply. Foreign rooms in potential industries (banking, 
shipping, construction…), companies such as STB (Sai Gon Thuong Tin Commercial Joint Stock 
Bank), ACB (Asia Commercial Bank), GMD (Gemadept Corporation), and HBC (Hoa Binh 
Construction & Real Estate Corporation)…had been continuously filled.  
 
As mentioning in previous part, the Decree 144 was promulgated as a general guide. And this 
decree was proved to be effective only in a tiny stock market in 2000-2005; for this reason, the 
Government promulgated and commenced an official Securities Law. However, it can say that this 
Securities Law is still not effective and powerful enough for the stock market. This has been proved 
by the issuances of many following securities decrees and acts to supplement for this law. 
Additionally, the increasing number of unpunished securities violations also proved the defects of 
Vietnam Securities Law.  
Section 3. VIETNAM STOCK MARKET IN THE DAWN 2008 TO CURRENT TIME 
(2010) 
Right after establishing a record peak at 1,170 points in March 2007, VNIndex slipped 
drastically to its bottom at 235.18 points in Feb 2009. However, the signal for this stumble seemed to 
appear during 2007. A three-fold rise at its peak of 1,170 over the past year had all the hallmarks of a 
bubble (Emerging Market Monitor, 2007). The State Bank of Vietnam tried to tighten the control 
over commercial bank loans by enforcing Decision 03 to limit bank loans for stock traders under 3 
percent of total outstanding loans. With this action, The State Bank of Vietnam attempted to reduce 
risks to balance sheets stemming from a potential market slump.  
 
At the same time, Vietnam stock exchange has been heavily influenced by the global financial 
crisis, which causes Black Monday, Tuesday… all over financial markets worldwide from New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), and Korea (KRX) to China Stock 
exchange… 
 
Neither any securities companies nor experts could predict which point was the bottom of 
 10 
VNIndex. Financial market had been on crisis and so had investors (individuals and institutions). 
People rushed and competed with one another to sell their stocks as soon and as many as possible. If 
in the short golden period 2006-2007, one of the most important criteria for securities companies to 
be chosen by investors was ―the speed of executing order to BUY‖, at this point of time ―the speed 
of executing order to SELL‖ became the ―key criteria‖. Supply had always exceeded demand in 
local investors‘ orders; yet it was not the case for foreign investors when their buying values were 
always higher or equal to selling value. However, Fig. 02 pointed that those trading values in 
2008-2010 have been only a half of that in 2007 when the market is at its peak time.  
         
Figure 02. Foreign investors trading value (VND billion)
8
 
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BUY 5,322 52,203 25,325 33,980 33,372 
SELL 1,244 29,329 19,498 30,655 22,242 
Source: www.hsx.vn  
 
 
As of December 2008, there are 170 companies listed on HOSE with market capitalization 
of VND 169,346 billion (USD 10.61 billion). This number has increased to 267 companies by Nov 
2010 with market capitalization of VND 529,325 billion (USD 33 billion)
9
. VNIndex has been 
moving around its strong defending level at 450 points. And it seems no one has an optimism view 
on Vietnam stock market at least in the short time. From beginning of 2010 to the current time, most 
of Southeast Asian emerging markets as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines have made 
an improvement around 40 percent while Vietnam stock market continues losing by 15 percent
10
. 
Vietnam stock market used to be ―best-performance Asia market‖ in 2006; it becomes ―most risky 
and dangerous market‖ in 2008. 
                                                        
8
 Own calculation on the basis of data obtained from Hochiminh Stock Exchange Website at www.hsx.vn  
9
 Exchange rate is calculated at 1USD = VND 20,000 
10
 Tran Thanh Tan, CEO of Vietnam Fund Management (VFM), www.Vnexpress.net, Nov 2010 
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Figure 03: VNIndex from July 2000 to July 2010 
 
                                   Source: www.vndirect.com.vn  
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CHAPTER 3. CURRENT PROBLEMS ON VIETNAM STOCK 
MARKET- ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ISSUE  
The movement of VNIndex in its 10-year history obviously shows a rapid but unstable 
development of the stock market (Nguyen Trong Hoai, Le An Khang et al, 2008), especially in the 
period 2006-2008. The situation seems not to be improved since the global financial crisis until now. 
After falling to its bottom of 200 points, VNIndex headed up to 400 points and kept lagging around 
that level for more than two years and a half. From being considered as ―best performance stock 
market‖ in 2006 to ―most risky and worst performance stock market‖ in 2008 (Bloomberg) with the 
clear signal of a significant bubble during 2007 (Emerging Market Monitor, 2007), Vietnam stock 
market proves that it is in trouble. In addition, whilst other Southeast Asia emerging markets are 
recovering, Vietnam stock market still cannot take back investors‘ confidence. What are problems 
behind this?  
Section 1. WEAK INFORMATION DISCLOSURE SYSTEM  
In developed stock exchanges such as New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE), Hong Kong Stock Exchange, listed companies are strictly required by securities 
regulation to disclose information timely and accurately; and all of these public information will be 
collected and disclosed through a united information disclosure system. Any investor, individual or 
institution, can access to the same information source easily. 
However, it is not the case in Vietnam Stock Exchange. Since Hochiminh Stock Exchange is 
the research object within this paper, information disclosure system of this exchange will be 
analyzed.  
Following Figure 04 will illustrate clearly how investors can reach disclosed information of 
listed companies: 
 
 
 
 13 
Figure 04. Theoretical information flow in Vietnam stock market 
 
         Source: Nguyen Thi Van Anh, 2004 
 
The chart shows investors can receive information from many ways: newspapers, annual 
reports, prospectuses, securities firms and Securities Trading Center. However, in reality, it is not 
that simple and easy for investors to access to useful and important information, which deriving from 
the imperfect or weaken disclose information system. The system is implemented and maintained just 
for the sake of having it. And since all of information will be ―mainly transferred by post mails, its 
punctuality is dependent on the efforts of relevant parties‖ (Nguyen Thi Anh Van, Toward a well 
functioning securities market in Vietnam, Chapter II, p. 38).  
 
Unlike other developed counterparts, Vietnam Stock Exchanges do not possess an official 
name for its disclosure system (such as EDGAR
11
 in USA or EDINET in Japan). Hochiminh Stock 
Exchange provides information to investors through its website www.hsx.vn , contenting only basic 
and poor information of listed companies as well as of the market (only maximum and minimum 
matching price of stocks in a trading day, room for foreign investors, volume of bought and sold 
shares...)  
 
                                                        
11
 The Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system 
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If in EDGAR or EDINET, ―all companies, foreign and domestic, are required to file 
registration statements, periodic reports, and other forms electronically‖
12
, listed companies in 
Vietnam are required to submit financial statements (annually and quarterly) and other necessary 
documents (prospectuses, internal trading activities…) in mainly hard copies and some of them 
might submit soft copies to stock exchanges where they are listed. These files later will be uploaded 
on HOSE or HNX websites
13
. And each company‘s information will be categorized under its trading 
code.  
 
Therefore, if one investor is interested in one company listed on HNX, he has to access to 
HXN and also has to know its exact trading code to get right information. Without knowing one 
company‘s trading code, it is almost impossible for them to find out its information 
 
It would be not more troublesome for investors if disclosure systems in both exchanges are 
the similar and standardized. Approaching almost two entirely different systems of files arranging 
methods, titles and even kinds of information, investors have to spend enormous amount of time to 
or not to get what they are looking for.  
 
Hence, the questions raised here are 
1) How individual as well as institutional investors get important information of listed and 
IPO companies if HOSE and SEC cannot meet their thirst of information, which can influence their 
in making investment decisions.  
2) If public information is that scarce and investors have to find and create their own 
information sources, who is the one has the most information in Vietnam stock market?  
                                                        
12
 EDGAR, Filings and Forms, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml  
13
 HOSE: www.hsx.vn and HXN www.hnx.vn  
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At the present time, there is no any research to tackle on these topics. Understanding that 
answering these questions can possibly help to draw a brief picture of Vietnam stock market 
activities, and also raise a flag to the public regarding to severe asymmetric information problem 
existing in Vietnam stock market, I have implemented a survey in Hochiminh Stock Exchange, of 
which results give exceptional surprises to any foreign professional investors.  
 
Section 2. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ISSUE - LOUDLY HAS THE BELL RUNG- 
SURVEY 
With the purpose to provide a clearer description of existing asymmetric information 
problem in Vietnam stock market to readers, I have conducted a trivial survey on 65 Vietnamese 
individual investors in Hochiminh stock exchange. The result of this survey in fact does surprise or 
shock any investor, who is familiar with trading stocks on such developed and transparent markets as 
the United State, Japan, UK or Hongkong… It shows that 80 percent of the survey attendants made 
trading decisions based mainly on inside information. And 100 percent of the sample population 
accesses to securities firms to get most updated data and information of listed companies, instead of 
visiting HOSE or HNX disclosure information system. Minority investors, especially who have no 
close relationship with brokerage firms, cannot get as much and updated information as the ones 
who have close relationship with these firms.  
 
The survey had been carried out within 15 days with the population of 65 investors aging 
from 25 to 50. There were 4 to 5 people joined the survey each day. Survey methods were 
interviewing through telephone, internet with programs Yahoo Messenger and Skype (there are 23 
people interviewed by this method), and face-to-face at trading floors of securities companies in 
Hochiminh City (42 people interviewed by this method). The questionnaire on average was 
completed in 15 minutes for each attendant. Besides answering the questionnaire, survey attendants 
also shared their own opinions and experiences regarding to inside information problem (for 
example: how to get those information, how to make it not-illegal when spread those information to 
 16 
other people…)  
 
Forty seven (47) out of 65 investors have been chosen randomly. However, interestingly, 31 
out of 42 investors interviewed by face-to-face method are VIP customers of securities companies, 
who have close relationship with brokerage departments and brokers of those companies. The other 
intentionally chosen 18 attendants are brokers, who are presently working for securities companies 
in Hochiminh City, Vietnam. In Vietnam stock regulation, brokers can also trade for their own 
private accounts (not only for companies‘ accounts). In general, the survey‘s sample population can 
be categorized into 3 main groups based on relationship with securities companies, listed companies 
and their trading capital: 18 brokers, 31 VIP clients and 16 typical customers.  
 
Figure 05.  Types of survey attendants 
 
 
 
According to the result, brokers are the most powerful dominants on the ground, in term of 
obtaining information, when they become the information hub in the market. Usually prior to 
companies‘ quarterly financial statements disclosed, or any investment projects announced or 
changes in large shareholders, brokers can receive inside information from corporate insiders before 
any other investor in the market based on their close relationship with those insiders. Getting 
beneficial and important information like that, brokers then spread it through the market. Definitely, 
there is a certain priority in level and speed of information spreading by brokers. In the survey, 
 17 
brokers have confirmed that those investors called ―VIP‖ clients of securities firms, where they are 
working for, will be updated first. Then the relationship between those brokers with other non-VIP 
individual investors will decide whether they share this kind of non-public information with these 
people or not.  
 
Remarkably, the result of this survey figures out that in Vietnamese stock market, brokers 
among securities firms cooperate well in term of information spreading; and evidently, ―inside 
information‖ plays as a decisive glue to connect them altogether. It is beneficial for all of them, but 
minority individual investors. According to 18 brokers interviewed in the survey, many forums, chat 
rooms are set up with the merely function of inside information exchanging among them. The more 
extensive network does a broker possess, the more ―sensitive and vital‖ information can he/she get 
prior to anyone else.  
 
Theoretically, Figure 04 shows the information flow in Vietnamese stock market. However, 
in reality, it is quite different. The result of this survey sketches another proper chart of information 
flow, in which securities firms and their brokers override SEC‘s role of major and solely public 
information discloser in Vietnam stock market.  
 
 
Figure 06. Information flow in case of Vietnam stock market in reality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results of the survey point out that SEC seems not to be the actual information disclosing 
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center, which it should and could have been, yet securities firms are. More obviously, SEC cannot 
less or more guarantee for the equality of information access for the sake of protecting uninformed 
investors from the informed ones. The above chart demonstrates that ―inside information‖ soon 
becomes semi-public information after it is obtained by so called ―other investors‖. Additionally, that 
SEC discloses information at some extent is only for that sake of disclosing since a part of public 
takes all advantages of this information quite sooner. To this stage, it is believed that readers will not 
be surprised to know that the survey also shows that 18 out of 18 brokers and 31 out of 31 VIP 
clients interviewed answer that they make investment decisions (buying or selling a particular stock) 
base on the inside information squeezed from insiders. This result is also confirmed by their trading 
frequency. Brokers trade for their own accounts periodically, meaning they choose to go long or 
short for a certain stock merely when they get information from insiders, especially before financial 
statement officially released by SEC at the end of each quarter or after listed companies‘ General 
Shareholders Meetings.  
 
In Vietnam stock regulations, insider trading
14
 is considered as an illegal trading activity. 
Hence, the question raised here is how insiders and brokers can breach this law and keep spreading 
inside information they obtain around the market? According to the survey, after informed by 
insiders with related financial tips (prior audited revenue, income, dividend…) or future investment 
projects through telephone, chat rooms and forums, brokers will whisper this previous information to 
other counter parts and VIP clients as soon as they can. Quick calls will be made from their private 
mobile phones, so that they can achieve speed as well as no evidence left.  And in these immediate 
conversations or emails, brokers are smart and tricky enough to use the words of ―rumors‖ or 
―sideline news‖ mentioning about the inside information, instead of an official confirmation or 
update. To do this, those brokers can simply avoid being caught or complained of committing a 
                                                        
14
 Insider trading: a person who engages in insider trading is ―A person who obtains, for itself or for third 
parties, a financial advantages through the exploitation of confidential information of which it dispose, 
due to a specific relationship which binds this person to a business; where this information is of a kind 
which, when revealed, is apt to exert a notable influence on the share prices (The Federal Council‘s 
message to the Swiss Parliament, Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann,1994) 
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crime of ―inside trading‖.  Ten out of eighteen brokers attending the survey firmly verify that ―it is 
called as rumor, but it is 99 percent true since it leaks out from insiders‖.  
 
Figure 07: Means of exchanging inside information 
 
   
 
Eighty percent of survey attendants (or 100 percent of brokers and VIP clients) confirm that 
public information disclosed by SEC is so out-of–dated that they call this information as 
“everyone-know-information”. Other 20 percent said they do not pay attention to information 
disclosed by SEC. The following graph shows how information disclosed by SEC is from the point 
of view of investors in the market relying on rough results from the survey:  
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Figure 08. Investors’ perception on SEC’s disclosed information 
 
 
 
In conclusion, the results of this survey have given us a snapshot of Vietnam stock market‘s 
current information disclosing status. This picture reveals the equality of information access in the 
market, and how the information of listed companies flows from its original sources (companies) to 
its final target (the public). The survey‘s outcomes, at a certain level, have answered two questions in 
previous chapter when it identifies insiders, brokers and VIP clients to be the ones, who can take 
advantages of inside information.  
 
Fore-mentioned facts and outstanding cases are some examples to support for the conclusion 
that asymmetric information problem not only does exist in Vietnam stock market but also exists at 
high level (Nguyen Trong Hoai, Le An Khang, et al, 2008). In their research, Nguyen Trong Hoai, 
Le An Khang (2008) has chosen model of Glosten and Harris (1988)
15
 to measure adverse selection 
cost, together with the model of Chung, K., Van Ness, B., Van Ness, R. (1999) to measure 
asymmetric information level on HOSE. This research has tested adverse selection cost that 
investors have to pay when they invest in stocks on HOSE. The result shows that adverse selection 
cost on HOSE is 4 percent compared to 1 percent on NYSE, and adverse selection component 
accounts for 90 percent of bid-ask spread. By this, it also concluded that asymmetric information 
                                                        
15
 Glosten and Harris (1988) add an adverse selection component of transaction costs. They assume 
asymmetric information is carried through trade frequency. 
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level on Hochiminh City Stock exchange is 4 times higher than that on NYSE. This conclusion was 
also supported by Truong Dong Loc, Ger Lanjouw, and Robert Lensink et al (2010). In their research, 
they proved that HOSE as a thin-trading market is not efficient on the weak-form
16
. It means that the 
price of stock on HOSE does not reflect the true price on the basis of past public available 
information. Furthermore, public information is known by a group of investors in advance before 
accessed by the whole market; this creates unfairness for major investors on the market and is 
beneficial for only a certain group of people, who can take advantage of inside information. 
Consequently, this will hinder the development of stock market in the long term, especially for a 
young market as HOSE.   
Section 3. UNHEALTHY COMPETITIONS AMONG SECURITIES COMPANIES IN THE 
MARKET 
While still working at a securities company in Vietnam, I had precious chance to meet and 
work with various foreign analysts and investors from developed securities markets in the world 
such as US, Japan, Korea, Australia…All of these people had the same first impression- 
astonishingly SURPRISED- when they received the answer of how many securities companies in 
Vietnam market from 2008 to current time. The number of newly established securities companies in 
Vietnam apparently demonstrates the situation of securities market in that year.  
                                                        
16
 Efficient-Market Hypothesis (EMH). According to this hypothesis, Weak EMH claims that prices on 
traded assets reflect all past publicly available information 
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Figure 09: Number is securities companies 
 
                                         Source: Own calculation  
 
When the market boomed from the end of 2006 to early 2008, there had been around 30 
securities companies newly established on average each year. In the contrast, when it is in the crisis 
from the end of 2008 to current time, only 03 companies had been established in 2009. Among 105 
securities, only top 20 companies (in term of registered capital and service quality) control 80% of 
the market share in brokerage, advisory and under writing services. There is a significantly severe 
competition among these 20 companies and among smaller companies with these companies. In such 
phenomena, many companies have used unfair and dirty tricks to attract more clients to survive in 
the market. Utilizing the advantage of close relationship with listed companies, which established 
during the listing advisory procedures, securities companies are always the first person in the market 
getting inside information only after insider. Those information will be updated through simple 
phone calls, sms texts, email and then through forum chat set up for brokers networks. Results of 
conducted survey mentioned above have pointed out that insiders and brokers‘ information exchange 
activities usually become more active at the end of each quarter and before General Shareholder 
Meetings; since at those points of time, important information of revenue, profit, investment plans, 
dividend, share splitting are most awaited by investors. And in order to compete with other 
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competitors, each securities company encourages and urges their brokers to hunt for such 
information to update their VIP customers at any price. Working in a securities company for more 
than two years and in financial field more than four years, I had experienced in investors‘ serious 
inside information thirst. They can close trading accounts and leave a certain company any time if 
their demands- although unfair and unlawful (but reasonable) demand are not fulfilled. Not only 
tipping inside information, brokers also try to steal investment portfolio of other securities 
companies and institutional financial investors for their own trading and for VIPs clients.  
 
In March 2010, the market has been dazed when information of investment portfolio of top 
10 securities companies and large foreign institutional investors was leaked out and brokers had used 
these lists as effective equipment to recommend for their clients trading activities.
17
  
 
Besides tipping inside information to other clients, securities companies also utilize the 
information for their own pop-trading activities. At the current time, in Vietnam, a securities 
company is allowed to trade for its own account. Therefore, it is apparent that securities companies 
possibly have ―unfair advantages over public customers when engaging in such trading‖. (Thomas 
Lee Hazen, 2009) 
                                                        
17
 http://www.tin247.com/manh_khoe_lam_an_cua_cac_cong_ty_chung_khoan-3-21575093.html - 
Tricks of securities companies 
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Figure 10. Information exchange among departments in a securities company in Vietnam 
 
 
 
Examining revenue structures on balance sheets and income statements of securities 
companies in Vietnam from 2008 to 2011, it is obvious to see that revenue from trading on their 
accounts make up an average of 35-50% in their total revenues
18
. In 2009, revenue from self-trading 
in top 05 securities firms accounted for more than 50% of their total revenue, specifically Saigon 
Securities Inc-SSI (57%), Hochiminh Securities Co. (63.23%), KimLong Securities Co (52.21%), 
Incom Bank Securities Co. (81%) and BaoViet Securities Co.(40%). In 2010, 88 out of 94 studied 
securities companies implemented self-trading activities. Especially, there were 03 companies, 
whose their income from pop-trading accounted for more than 70 percent of their revenue, such 
companies were Asia Europe Securities Company (82.61%), Sacom Bank Securities Company 
(82.12%, equivalent to VND1,131 billion) and Viet Capital Securities Company (70.11%). (Ho Ba 
Tinh, Revenue of Securities Companies Revealed, Saigon Economy Newspaper, 2011). This shows 
the important role of self-trading activity in each brokerage firm‘s operation. For this reason, in large 
brokerage firms, activities of brokerage, advisory
19
, analyze departments support for self-trading 
department at their best. Those four departments cooperate sturdily to create a solid cube, where 
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http://wap.vnmedia.vn/vn/pages/25/227394/tiet-lo-nguon-goc-doanh-thu-cua-cac-cong-ty-chung-khoan.ht
ml  
19
 in most securities in Vietnam, advisory and underwriting services are in Advisory Department 
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information exchange is exceptionally important.  
 
Thanks to this operation way, obviously, there is no Chinese Wall existing among these 
departments to avoid conflict of interest between the securities company itself and its clients, which 
must have in securities law of other developed securities market. (Harry Mc Vea, Financial 
conglomerates and the Chinese Wall, Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1993).  
Section 4. INSIDERS: INSIDE INFORMATION LEAKERS AND TRADERS- 
IRRESPONSIBILITY OF LISTED CORPORATE 
Section 2 and 3 helps exploring the reality: investors in Vietnamese stock market are 
categorized into four types: insiders, brokers, VIP and typical public investors based on the order of 
inside information obtaining and utilizing ability. Although ―VIP investors and brokers‖ can take 
advantage of inside information against ―typical investors‖, all of them are still suffered from 
insiders‘ inside information seizing ability at some extent. Insiders (managers, accountants, 
auditors…) are firstly and most informed investors with crucial inside information. With the inside 
information, they can act before anyone else in the market and even mislead the market for the sake 
of their benefits through most popular violation: price manipulation. In 2008-2009, 50 percent of 
listed companies on HOSE do not submit their financial statements in time
20
, particularly at the end 
of each quarter and after the General Shareholder Meetings. The reason explaining for late 
submission has never been reported clearly by listed corporate and they have not been required to do 
so either. The longer is publicly disclosing required date from the end of each quarter, the bigger is 
the information gap between insiders and other investors. It is also important for readers to know 
that in Vietnamese stock markets, large share holders of listed companies, especially those are 
originating from joint-stock or private companies, CEO, managers, vice managers, Board of 
Controlling members are also large shareholders. Utilizing their positions in the corporate, those 
insiders can squeeze inside information and make investment decision to gain excessive benefit on 
                                                        
20
 Hochiminh Stock Exchange‘ announcement on its website to remind more than 100 companies to 
submit their financial reports in 3
rd
 quarter , 2010 (www.hsx.vn ) 
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the expenses of other public investors‘. In 2009, The State Securities Commission of Vietnam (SSC) 
reported 155 cases of insider trading out of 484 investigated trading orders (32 percent) from 280 
large shareholders. It is believed that the number of revealed cases is so small compared to the real 
number of cases occurring on the market that it cannot provide the whole picture of the severe 
situation.  
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CHAPTER 4. CAUSES OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
PROBLEM IN VIETNAM STOCK MARKET  
Section 1. LACK OF EFFECTIVE REGULATION FRAMEWORK AND LAW 
IMPLEMENTATION ON INSIDER TRADING  
Insider trading is a trading activity that is conducted on the basis of unequal information 
accessibility by informed investors and that can erode the confidence of other investors and the 
effective operation of a stock market. Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann (1994) confirmed  
“…the smooth operation of that market depends to a large extent on the confidence it 
inspires in investors; whereas the factors on which such confidence depends include the assurance 
afforded to investors that they are placed on equal footing and that they will be protected against the 
improper use of inside information; whereas, by benefiting certain investors as compared with 
others, insider dealing is likely to undermine that confidence and may therefore prejudice the smooth 
operation of the market…” 
 
The smooth operation of Vietnam stock market has been negatively affected due to the large 
existence of asymmetric information problem and substantial growth of insider dealings. What are 
the main causes of asymmetric information and what encourages investors to breach the law to 
conduct insider dealings? Since the global financial crisis in 2008, in Vietnam, an enormous number 
of conferences and discussion forums have been organized aiming to find ways to improve Vietnam 
stock market situation, in which investors‘ falling confidence has become one of the most concerned 
issues. The vague and weak regulations on insider trading have been believed to be the core of the 
problem. It is typical everywhere that investors always favor in getting much information related to 
the stock they are interested in. The amount of information and the speed of information updating 
can affect significantly investors‘ decisions. Unexceptionally, on Vietnam stock market where 
available public information of listed companies is scarce and investors have to self-collect 
information of listed or OTC companies (Nguyen Thi Van Anh, 2004). Given that the regulations are 
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not comprehensive and strict enough; investors find any mean to breach the law to obtain what they 
need. And in this scenario, informed investors can exploit advantage from non-informed ones.  
 
The concern here is that despite having the history of 10 years development, Vietnam 
securities law is at large extent similar to Germany‘s law before 1989 when a self-regulation and 
self- regulatory applied (Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, 1994). Market capitalization 
accounting for more than 31 percent of Vietnam‘s GDP on average since 2006
21
, the lack of 
plausible system on insider trading regulation in Vietnam stock market can potentially paralyze its 
operation and the reputation as ―one of the most attractive emerging markets‖.  
  
When the market incredibly rose from the end of 2006 to the end of 2007, investors enjoyed 
the gains and seemed to forget (or ignored) the weakness of regulation on insider trading. However, 
people, especially minority investors, who do not have close relationship with either brokers or 
insiders, started to realize the weaknesses and the lack of insider trading regulation system when the 
market started to plummet. In 2008 and 2010, several cases of insider trading, financial information 
frauds from public listed companies, and unhealthy competition among securities companies have 
publically emerged. To compete with one another in attracting more clients, securities companies 
tried to employ their relationship with insiders to get important private information and then provide 
it to their clients before that information is publicly disclosed. Additionally, securities companies are 
allowed to do proprietary without any risk management system or Chinese wall policy applied to 
separate its brokerage and self-investment activities.  
 
In September 2009, former CEO of Vietin Bank Securities Joint-stock company was 
investigated on insider trading activity of 3 million shares of Pha Lai Thermal Power Joint Stock 
Company (PPC) to appropriate the State‘s VND 90 billion (USD 5.63 million). In this case, Vietin 
Bank Securities Joint-stock company was a PPC‘s advisor on its IPO procedure. Utilizing the 
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 Vietnam market capitalization compared to GDP: 1% (2000- 2005), 22.7% (2006), 43% (2007), 18% 
(2008), 39% (2010), and 32.5% (in six months of 2011) 
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advantage as an advisor, this CEO bought and her team bought PPC shares in advance.  
 
On 26
th
 November and 03
rd
 December 2010, CEO- President of Management Board and Vice 
CFO – Chief Accountant of Vien Dong Pharmaceutical Company (DVD) were arrested for using 
inside information to manipulate DVD‘s stock price. CEO and Vice CFO altogether with their team 
set up many subsidiaries (ponzi scheme) to buy DVD‘s products and sold back to DVD in order to 
create unreal revenue for DVD. Besides, they also made financial information frauds to sell DVD 
shares to the public.  
 
Being considerably different from insider trading regulations from US, Britain, Germany..., 
which have clear definition of ―insider‖ and ―inside information‖, Vietnam insider trading law 
(Decree 70/2006) merely list out type of persons, who is called ―persons who know inside 
information‖ and are forbidden to trade: 
- Members of Management Board, Control Board, CEOs or Managers, Deputy managers 
- Large shareholders of public companies and public funds 
- Auditors of public companies and public funds 
- Other persons, who can access to inside information 
- Securities companies and securities companies‘ employees 
- Institutions and individuals, who do business with public companies 
- Institutions and individuals, who directly or indirectly can access inside information from 
above objects 
At the first glance, insider trading regulation seems to be exceptionally extensive in regulated 
objects since almost every participant on the stock market, who has get known corporate or 
 30 
securities companies, can be directly or indirectly considered as ―person that knows inside 
information‖. Yet the law does not clearly define what ―inside information‖ is and who actual 
―insider‖ is. For that reason, ―it cannot distinguish between insiders and non-insiders and therefore, 
it is difficult to impose liabilities on a non-insider who has obtained inside information by improper 
means , but has not directly traded or has merely just recommended others to trade.”(Nguyen Thi 
Van Anh, 2004). Given huge hole by the flaw, insiders open more than one trading account
22
 at 
different securities companies under their relatives‘ or friends‘ names to make inside trading or to 
manipulate shares‘ price. These insiders can also recommend these people to hold/buy or sell his 
company‘s stock when they know the related information. 
 
Additionally, according to this law, only large shareholders (who hold from 5 percent of 
voting shares
23
) become the object of forbidden trading. From this perspective, it infers that 
shareholders holding less than 5 percent of a public company‘s shares, who is not large shareholder, 
is out of the list; and therefore, can carry out inside trading. 
 
Apparently, missing to define ―insider and non-insiders‖ and ―inside information‖, Decree 
70/2006 ―also failed at defining prohibited activities done by insiders” (Nguyen Thi Anh Van, 2004) 
as well as failed to stipulate prohibited behaviors carried out by non-insiders, who has inside 
information. To see how different it is between Vietnam and US‘s insider trading law- Rule 10b-5, 
let‘s read how a ―tippee‖ is apparently defined in Rule 10-b. 
 
According to the rule: in order to violate Rule 10-b, a tippee must have ―actual knowledge 
that the information was disclosed in a breach of fiduciary duty‖ and also ―know or have reason to 
know that it was non-public and had been obtained improperly be selective revelation or otherwise‖; 
and a tipper is concerned as ―one who deliberate tips information which he knows to be material and 
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 According to Vietnam securities law, one investor is allowed to open only one trading account at a 
certain securities company. From the point of view of law maker, this can prevent/minimize the intention 
to commit price manipulation violations of people.  
23
 Securities Law, Decree 70/2006, p.3 
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non-public to an outsider who mar reasonably be expected to use it to his advantage has the requisite 
scienter‖ (Thomas Lee Hazen,2009).
24
  
 
According to Mr. Le Chi Thu Khoa, Deputy Director of Research and Development of 
Hochiminh Stock Exchange, insider dealings are becoming popular sanctions in the market and are 
carried out in more sophisticated ways since benefits gained from them are enormous. One of the 
most popular sophisticated means utilized by insider trading is that large shareholders tend to 
―forget‖ to announce their purchasing or selling shares plan to SSC or to the public media before 
they actually do it. Or, large shareholders often are CEOs, Managers, Chief accountants... of 
corporate, try to dodge the vague law by entitling their shares under their relatives‘ names as 
presents. With this way, they do not have to announce to SEC. Afterward, the second owners can 
easily trade shares. And currently, Vietnam securities law does not have any regulation to impose 
liability on such transactions.     
Section 2. VAGUE REGULATION ON PROHIBITION OF OMISSION OF 
INFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION 
Omission of information and misinformation can lead public investors to misunderstanding 
and unfair information accessibility. In Decree 70/2006, Sub-articles 01 and 02 of Article 09, entitled 
―Forbidden Activities‖, simply reads:  
- Directly or indirectly create and circulate untrue information, omit essential information, 
which can lead to serious misunderstanding of shares offering, listing, trading, and investing 
activities.  
- Conduct misinformation or being late in disclosing information, which can have severe 
effect on shares trading activities on the market.   
 
It is claimed that the scope of this provision is too vague and simple to address what kind of 
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 Thomas Lee Hazen (2009), Securities Regulation in a nutshell, 10
th
 Edition, Insider Trading, p.153 
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information and statements that ―essential information‖ shall be included. Essential information 
stated in the Sub-article 01 and 02 can be understood in either ways: it refers to the statements in 
dossier required SEC
25
 or any kind of statement made in any form (oral or written). For this reason, 
brokers or any insiders or anyone who can access to inside information can utilize the words of 
―rumor‖ as a mean to leak out the omitted information and use it to make inside transactions. 
Besides, insiders can utilize this unclear provision to omit the information that they purposely judge 
as ―unessential information‖ to not make it public on time.  
 
Additionally, the regulation is also unclear when it states the term ―severe effect on trading 
activities‖. The definition of severe effect is still missing; and once again, this defect makes the law 
difficult to impose liability on related persons. Inadvertently, these ambiguous regulations open 
chances for people to be unlawful when they omit important information and pass the disadvantages 
to other public investors.   
 
Following cases are outstanding examples, in which some individuals and institutions exploit 
the defect of misinformation to gain benefit by announcing information of their purchasing and 
selling plan to mislead the market.  
In September 2010, Pham Anh Duong, Chairman of Management Board and CEO of Plastic 
and Green Environment Joint-stock Company (code: AAA, listed on HOSE) announced his plan to 
buy 500,000 shares of AAA and to sell 500,000 same shares. However, in fact, Pham merely sold off 
500,000 shares and did not purchase any additional as announced at the beginning. During his 
transaction, AAA‘s price went down by 13%.  
 
Or recently, Saigon-Hanoi Securities Company registered to buy and sell 500,000 shares of 
Vung Tau Real Estate and Construction Company (code: VRC). However, this company actually 
bought 104,750 shares and sold only 4,000 shares.  
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 Dossier includes: income statement, balance sheet, audit financial statements, prospectus… (referring 
to www.hsx.vn ) 
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PAN Pacific Corporation registered to buy 2 million and to sell 1.5 million shares of Saigon 
Securities Joint-stock Company (code: SSI). Yet, PAN sold out the total of 760,000 shares of SSI and 
did not purchase a single share as scheduled.  
 
It is obvious to claim that those companies and insiders misled the market or other public 
investors by their misinformation of selling and buying schedule at the same time. However, they 
were not imposed with liability since the regulation on ―Misinformation and Omission of 
information‖ does not have any article to minimize their tricky practices. To breach the regulation 
lawfully, those people accused that they were not able to buy registered shares due to ―the situation 
of market‖. What should be noticed here is that all of related persons in above cases are ―large 
shareholders‖, who less or more can access to inside information of the targeted companies. And 
their justifications are as ambiguous as the regulation is. 
 
To upgrade and revise the regulation on ―Misinformation and Omission of information‖, 
Vietnamese law makers should have learnt from their counterparts- US. In the US Securities 
Exchange Law, Section entitled ―Liability for Misleading Statements‖, what statements are 
concerned and what liability can be imposed on committed person is regulated clearly:  
 “Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application, report, 
or document filed pursuant to this title or any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking 
contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 15 of this title … shall 
be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance 
upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such 
statement, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that hr acted in 
good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading.” 
 
In this section, the term ―any statement‖ is used instead of ―untrue information/statement‖. 
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Purposely, ―any statement‖ can cover both ―material misstatement and omission of material facts‖, 
with such statement price of shares purchased and sold can be affected. (Nguyen Thi Van Anh, 2004). 
With clear and detailed provision like this, no scienter misleading information violator can be 
escaped from being imposed liability.    
 
In addition to poorly defining ―misinformation and omission of information‖ activities, 
Article 09 of Decree 70/2006 also does not regulate on liability, which violators can be imposed with. 
However, in 2011, law makers plan to revise this provision by adding some administrative sanction, 
which is believed to be merely symbolized for the sake of having but not strict enough to reduce the 
spreading violations in the market.   
Section 3. IMBALANCE BETWEEN INCENTIVE AND PENALTY EXECUTION IN 
STOCK MARKET  
Altogether with the lack of regulation on ―Insider Trading‖ and the ambiguity of ―Omission 
of Information and Misinformation‖ provision, the imbalance between incentive and penalty 
execution contributes a noticeable part in the list of causes leading to asymmetric information 
problem in Vietnam stock market.   
 
In the discussion above, many case studies have revealed that enormous profit gained a 
extraordinarily short time from insider trading and other unlawful activities has strongly encouraged 
violators to try to breach the regulation in Vietnam stock market. Trading with inside information, 
omitting crucial information in public statements, misleading the market with inaccurate 
announcement related to share purchasing and sale plan are the most common and spreading 
violations have been employed most frequently. 
 
From the 2008 to the current time- 2011, when public investors started to understand more 
about the stock market and its operation, many cases of insider trading, financial information frauds 
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from public listed companies, unhealthy competition of securities companies (to attract more clients 
with inside information provision before that information is submitted to local Stock Exchanges) 
have been discovered. And it is believed that number of those revealed cases is just a tiny part of a 
floating iceberg.  
 
In its annual report in 2009, The State Securities Commission of Vietnam (SSC) announced 
155 cases of insider trading out of investigated 484 trading orders (32 percent) from 280 large 
shareholders. According to securities law, large shareholders of public companies, who hold more 
than 5 percent of company‘s stocks, have to announce their trading plan (buying or selling) to stock 
exchange and on public media at least 5 days before their trades are actually executed. However, 
those shareholders have delayed their announcement on purpose to mislead the public or announce 
one way but behave other way to gain more benefit.  
 
Among these 155 cases, cases of one shareholder owning 8.5 percent and 11.6 percent of 
Cement Materials and Transportation JSC (VTV) selling out her stocks without either announcing to 
the public media or registering to SEC. 
 
Case 1: Nguyen Thi Kim Phuong, large shareholder
26
 of VTV had sold out 557,800 shares of 
VTV (accounting for 8.5 percent of VTV total listed shares) on 24
th
 March 2010 without registering 
with SEC or publicizing this information.
27
 The noticeable point here is that on 03
rd
 February 2010, 
she announced on public media and registered to buy 1.3 million shares of VTV at the price of VND 
40,000 per share (or 2 USD). However, this bid had been canceled regarding to the rise of 30 percent 
of price share.
28
 When the price went up to VND 55,000, she earned profit of USD 500,000 by 
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 Person is listed as major shareholder if s/he holds from 5% of total listed shares of a certain listed 
company, Vietnam Securities Regulation, Decree 48/1998 
27
 http://vnexpress.net/gl/kinh-doanh/chung-khoan/2010/04/3ba1a688/- Large shareholder sneaked out, 
minority shareholders strike 
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 Decree 70/2006 said ―a large shareholder or insider can cancel her purchasing/sale plan if the 
market bid/ask price after the registering and announcing date is 30 percent higher/lower than their 
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selling peacefully. With the announcement of 1.3 million shares purchasing plan, purposely she 
misled the market in order to push up the price of VTV to 30 percent higher; and then quietly sold 
out all of the shares she was holding at higher price.  
 
This case is just one of 155 insider-trading, misleading and omission of information cases 
investigated by SEC. The consequences of this kind of disclosure violation are that minority 
investors‘ confidence is substantially eroded, and it can create an unhealthy trend in the market, 
where fair and true information are provided. According to my own estimation, with this trade, 
Phuong could earn from USD 700,000 to USD 900,000 while might pay the penalty (according to 
securities law) of only USD 2,000. This shows that the incentive of breaching law is much higher 
than penalty. Commenting on this case, Dr. Le Tham Duong, Head of Business Management 
Department at Hochiminh City Banking University, raised his question: ―Stock Law (Decree 
70/2006) regulates that large shareholder must announce her sale plan on public media before 
executed (and any broker has to know this). Who executed this sale order?‖ Dr. Duong added that 
current penalty policy is not appropriate enough to warn violators when their fine seemed to be a 
hundred times lower than their incentive.   
 
Case 2: PhaLai Thermal Electricity Company (code: PPC, listed on Hochiminh Stock 
Exchange). Pham Thi Tuyet Mai, former CEO of Vietnam Techcombank Securities Company had 
bought 3 million shares of PhaLai Thermal Electricity Company (PPC) while Vietnam Techcombank 
Securities Company was PPC‘s advisor for its first initial public offerings. Taking advantage of 
inside information provided by PPC as an advisor, Pham Thi Tuyet Mai and her team had bought 3 
million shares and then sold out when PPC was listed to earn a profit of 90 billion VND (or 5.6 
million USD)
29
.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
planned bid/ask price‖ 
29
 exchange rate in 2008 , 1 USD = 16,000 VND  
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This case has been investigated since 16
th
 January 2008; however, until this moment March 
2011, it has not been judged or clarified yet and no one knows what kind of punishment or penalty 
those violators will be imposed.  
 
Discussing of current trading management and supervision activities on stock market, leaders 
and managers from Hochiminh Stock Exchange have confirmed that many cases of insider dealings 
and large shareholders selling stocks without announcing. However, those violators merely received 
warning letters from the State Securities Committee (SSC).   
 
It would be more helpful when comparing how different the liability that defendant violators 
in Vietnam and US stock markets are imposed on by looking at the penalties regulated in these two 
countries. 
 
In Vietnam, before May 2011, securities law regulated insider trading and misinformation 
and omission of information violations to be ―securities trading violations‖ and the penalty for these 
violations is a fine of USD 1,500-2,000 (VND 30 million to VND 50 million) for individual violator 
and of USD 2,000-3,500 (VND 50 million to VND 70 million) for institutional violator. Additionally, 
according also to the revised regulation on insider trading, the defendant violator must pay back the 
total amount of profit he gained from the violating transaction; however, there is no regulation 
related to the loss avoided from possessing inside information while trading.  
 
In US, under §21A of 1934 Act:  
“if any person violates the 1934 Act or any rule thereunder by trading while in possession of 
material nonpublic information, or by communicating such information in connection with a 
securities transaction, the SEC can go to court to seek a civil penalty equal to three times the amount 
of the profit gained or the loss avoided by the illegal transaction”.  
Besides, the penalty will be imposed on both the violator and the person who “controlled” 
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the violator; and the penalty that the “controlling person” must bear cannot exceed $1 million. An 
amendment made to modified SEA §32 in 1988 says “the penalty for violation of the Act will be 
from $100,000 to $1 million, in the case of individuals and from $500,000 to $2.5 million in the case 
of other entities” 
 
Apparently, with the same degree of violation, defendant violator in US received much harsh 
penalty than his counterpart in Vietnam (mainly administrative sanction, at least until this point of 
time). The penalty that those persons received is too trivial compared to the incentive they got when 
they chose to cheat. 
Section 4. INCOMPETENT AND BACKWARD TECHNOLOGY OF INFORMATION 
DISCLOSING AND TRADING SUPERVISION SYSTEM   
 
Section 2 of chapter 1 has pointed out some major problems of the information disclosing 
system of Vietnam Stock Market: 
1. Required information disclosing forms (financial statements, prospectuses, urgent 
information…) are not standardized. Each public company has its own form and style to disclose.  
2. Disclosed public information on website of HOSE (Hochiminh Stock Exchange) is 
apparently poor and out-of- dated. It is considerably difficult (if not almost impossible) for investors 
to trace back data of both listed companies and companies on OTC market. 
3. Bilingual system is incompetent. One foreign investor, who are interested in Vietnam stock 
market but has no relationship with a securities company, definitely cannot get information from 
HOSE information system as he wishes. Some foreign investors asked for their opinion on Vietnam 
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stock market information system replied: ―It takes us two hours to get a full list of public companies 
listed on Thailand Stock Exchange with all general information of these companies. And it takes us 
almost forever to get the same thing in Vietnam information system‖. 
 
The above three at- first-sight information disclosing problems are believed to be the results 
of incompetent technology. And partially, the increasing number of stock trading violations cases is 
also the results of backward technology in supervision system. The Securities Law requires all of 
public listed companies to submit all of their information including financial statement, investment 
plans, dividend payment decision, and list of large shareholders right after the General Shareholders 
Meeting to HOSE or HASTC. And the law did not regulate the specific time that those companies 
need to submit after the meetings. Yet, after receiving all of information from listed companies, it 
usually takes HOSE from four to five days to have it updated on the website. In these 04 to 05 days, 
it is simply understandable that important information can be leaked out any time before accessed by 
public investors.  
 40 
CHAPTER 5. LESSONS DRAWN FROM SECURITIES 
REGULATION AND POLICIES APPLIED BY DEVELOPED 
MARKETS IN PREVENTING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
PROBLEM 
  
Various solutions have been applied by many other developed stock markets in the world 
aiming to maintain the fairness of a market to all public investors. The only objective of this chapter 
is to list out and get solutions, regulations and policies that authorities in the US, Japan, Britain, 
Germany, France, Switzerland, Netherlands, and Ireland currently apply to prevent insider trading, 
price manipulation, and conflict of interests among securities companies and their clients. Learning 
from these regulations, only applicable solutions to Vietnam market background are selected to 
recommend to relevant authorities in Vietnam to control and minimize its severe asymmetric 
information problem.    
Section 1. UNITED STATE OF AMERICA  
5.1.1. Disclosure information system (EDGAR) 
 
In chapter 3 and 4 of this paper, Vietnam‘s SEC information disclosing system has been 
found in incompetent technology and poor in information disclosed. This is one of main causes 
leading to asymmetric information problem in Vietnam stock market. It has been ten years of 
operation; yet this disclosing information system has not been either upgraded or properly invested 
suitably with its importance. Therefore, Vietnam stock market, specifically SEC is in the rush to 
have an efficient and advanced disclosure information system. It would be useful to learn from 
EDGAR, an effective disclosure information system. EDGAR is “The Electronic Data Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval system, performs automated collection, validation, indexing, acceptance, and 
forwarding of submissions by companies and others who are required by law to file forms with the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Its primary purpose is to increase the efficiency 
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and fairness of the securities market for the benefit of investors, corporations, and the economy by 
accelerating the receipt, acceptance, dissemination, and analysis of time-sensitive corporate 
information filed with the agency”.  Anyone can access to essential information, data of public 
companies and all of listed companies are strictly regulated to disclose information to SEC 
electronically at the shortest required time, which can reduce the chance of leaking information to 
outsiders. EDGAR can be accessed at http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.  
5.1.2. Regulations on insider trading 
 
In his book Securities Regulation in a nutshell, Thomas Lee Hazen has indicated that one of 
the most important applications of Rule 10b-5, in Act 1934, is its use as a sanction against ―insider 
trading‖. Therefore, unlike Vietnamese regulation against the same violation, Rule 10b-5 makes it 
clear and detailed in defining unlawful ―insider trading‖ violators. Definition of ―insider‖ in Rule 
10b-5 extended beyond officers, directors, and large shareholders to ―anyone who receives 
information from a corporate source‖ and insider trading is ―any securities transaction bearing two 
elements of “the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose, and the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take 
advantage of that inside information by trading without disclosure”
30
    
 
Additionally, Rule 10-b also has regulated how insider trading violators can be imposed with 
the penalty, which I believed that it is strict enough to discourage persons who have intention to 
violate. The penalty is ―three times the amount of the profit gained or the loss avoided by illegal 
transaction‖. Not only would violators be penalized, under 1934 Act, ―controlling person‖
31
 with 
whom violators are associated is also fined (not exceeding $1 million). This regulation at some 
extent requires firms to have appropriate compliance and risk management procedure to carefully 
prevent those violations from occurring. This legal point should be put into Vietnam law makers‘ 
consideration since can help Vietnamese SEC to refrain the unhealthy competition among securities 
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 Chiarella v United States, 445 US 222, 227 (1980) 
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 The firm violator is associated with (Thomas Lee Hazen, 2009) 
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companies, in which those companies encourages their brokers to attract clients by any means even 
tipping inside information.     
 
Furthermore, 1934 Act‘s §21A also encourage people to ―blow the whistle‖ on insider trading 
by ―providing up to 10% of any civil penalty recovered by the SEC to any person who provide 
information leading to the imposition of the penalty‖. (Thomas Lee Hazen, 2009).  
5.1.3. Application of Chinese Wall 
 
The establishment of financial conglomerates in 1975 and 1986, as a definite result of 
significantly growing diversification and competitiveness pressure after the financial deregulation in 
US and UK, had eroded the division between commercial and investment banking services. That one 
financial firm can provide multiple services of banking, corporate finance, investment management, 
brokerage at the same time has raised the question of conflicts of interests as well as other risks. To 
protect public investors, it was crucial for regulators in these two countries to seek for an appropriate 
solution. And Chinese Wall
32
 has been considered as ―one legal and economic regulatory technique 
and a key mechanism for regulating conflicts in multifunctional financial firms” by regulators. 
(Harry Mc Vea, Financial conglomerates and the Chinese Wall, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993).  
 
It is believed that Vietnamese regulators and securities firms understand the definition and 
function of Chinese Wall in reducing conflicts of interests between investors and securities firms 
themselves. However, such risk management method has not been considered and yet to apply in 
their operations.   
Also according to Harry Mc Vea, ―Chinese Wall‖ consists of policies and procedures to 
operate departments within a financial conglomerate, specifically to restrict or block the flow of 
information to the decision maker, which might be different from firm to firm. Yet there are some 
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 Chinese Wall is a self-styled regulatory mechanism aimed at stemming the flow of information from 
one department in a conglomerate to another and resolving the legal problems associated with conflicts of 
interest and duty generally. (Harry Mc Vea, 1993) 
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basic (bed-rocks) in any Chinese Wall: “compliance manual, systematic identification of risk areas, 
procedure risks are to be addressed, compliance responsibilities clearly demarcated,  routine 
monitoring and periodic review of compliance procedures, contingency plans in the event of 
accidental disclosure of inside information, ongoing educational and training programmes, 
regulatory links, encouraging clients to disclose confidential news, procedure to determine whether 
information is to bypass the wall, and trading records”. (Harry Mc Vea, 1993) 
Section 2. JAPAN 
Response to a call for a fair securities market, where equal information accessibility of public 
investors is assured and insider trading will be punished, a stricter provisions regulating insider 
trading was introduced in 1989, specifically Article 109-2 and Article 109-3. These articles prohibit 
―certain types of transactions by certain categories of persons‖. And insider trading has also become 
object to criminal sanction, according to which any person violating provisions of Articles 109-2 or 
109-3 will be imposed on ―imprisonment with the requirement of labor for not more than six months 
and/or a fine of not more than five hundred thousand yen‖ (Kazumi Okamura, Chieko Takeshita, 
1989). 
 
Besides tightening insider trading regulation, Financial Services Agency of the Japanese 
government also operated an advanced disclosure information system called EDINET (Electronic 
Disclosure for Investors' NETwork). Similarly to EDGAR system in United States, EDINET 
includes information of Japanese companies since 2001 and traded companies is obligated to their 
disclose information on this network. Investors can access to this system to obtain information of 
their interested traded companies at http://info.edinet-fsa.go.jp/     
Section 3. BRITAIN 
The new thing, which should also be noticed by Vietnamese law makers and governors, in 
Britain Criminal Justice Act 1993 regulating on Insider Trading is that besides detailed and clear 
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definitions of ―insider trading, inside information, insider disclosure‖, the Act also defines ―insider 
encouragement‖. Insider encouragement is person who ―encourages another person to deal in 
securities that are price-affected securities
33
 in relation to the information, knowing or having 
reasonable cause to believe that the dealing would take place in the circumstanced” (Gerhard 
Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, 1994). If this kind of ―insider encouragement‖ is regulated in 
Vietnam securities law, at some extent, can prevent brokers from utilizing tricks to tip their clients in 
a not-breaching-law way.  
 
Britain Criminal Justice Act 1993 also set out the penalties applied for insider dealing, in 
which violator is ―term of imprisonment of up to seven years and or unspecified fine‖ (Gerhard 
Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, 1994)  
Section 4. GERMANY  
Before November 1989, Germany had no ―pertinent statutory law‖ on insider trading. Rather, 
a self-regulated rule was applied. Yet, It is true that in Germany insider trading rules are breached 
less frequently than elsewhere. However, to be competitive with other international financial centers 
such as New York, Tokyo and London, an insider trading statutory regulations become necessary and 
inevitable. For that reason, Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing was promulgated since 
1989 (Dr. Gerhard Wegen and Prof. Dr. Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Insider Trading in Western Europe: 
Current Status, Graham and Trotman and International Bar Association, 1994, page 3). Similarly to 
regulations of US and Britain, Insider Trading law in Germany also has comprehensive definition of 
insiders, inside information, inside securities, for example: Inside information is “knowledge of 
circumstances not yet disclosed or publicly known which could affect the evaluation of the Insider 
securities…‖ Additionally, in Germany, insider trading violation cases will be investigated by an 
Investigation Commissions established at the stock exchange, which ―consisting of a Chairman and 
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 price affected securities: if and only if the information would , if made public , be likely to have a 
significant effect on the price of the securities (Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, 1994) 
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four other members and the Chairman is required to be an active and experienced judge in 
commercial law‖. This can be considered by Vietnamese SEC and SSC to be an independent entity 
to deal with insider trading and also other violations related to securities trading activities.  
Section 5. FRANCE  
Supporting for the urge of promulgating stricter regulations and heavier penalties as an 
inevitable solution for insider trading, asymmetric information problems, this paper especially focus 
on the punishment applied in other securities market. Under Insider Trading law in France, ―Insider 
trading is punished under Article 10-1 first paragraph of the 1867 Ordinance by two months to two 
years imprisonment and/or fine ranging from FF 6,000 to FF 10,000,000 or ten times the amount of 
profit generated by the illegal transaction, whichever is higher.‖ If compared to penalties applied on 
the same violations, US law makes it clearer with term “profit gained or loss avoided”. Yet, the 
penalties applied in France case is much heavier – ―ten times the amount of profit gained‖- than 
those in US- only three times higher the amount of unlawful profit gained/loss avoided. Moreover, 
the rule also regulated: ―the fine cannot be lower than the profit realized, concerning commercial 
companies and all persons who, in connection with the exercise of their profession or duties, have 
access to privileged information on the prospect of the status of an issuer of transferrable securities 
or on the future prospects of a negotiable future contracts , and who have conducted or knowingly 
allowed to be conducted one or more transactions on the market , either directly or through a third 
party, before the general public was aware of this information.‖ Not only being regulated for the 
sake of having it- as it does happen in Vietnam, heavy penalties have been recently imposed by both 
the courts and the COB in cases of La Ruche Meridionale-BUE, Paribas-Societe Generale de 
Fonderie, Delalande and Pechiney. (Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, 1994) 
Section 6. NETHERLANDS  
There are 3 crucial key points withdrawn from solutions of Netherlands to solve asymmetric 
information through its Insider Trading regulations as follow:  
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1. In Model Code enacted in 1986, certain members of company such as Board of Directors, 
the Board of Commissioners and ―designated officers‖, who are persons can access to price-sensitive 
information who have been identified as such the company concerned will be prohibited from 
trading in suspects periods (for example: 2 months prior to the publication of the annual report, 
dividend payment, 1 month prior to the publication of prospectus). 
2. Setting up the Exchange Trading Supervision Department called the Stock-watch to 
monitor and analyze price and trade volume developments of listed securities. Once the Stock 
Exchange Board suspect insider trading case based on Stock-watch reports or other grounds, it will 
request the Control Bureau of Association to conduct the investigation.  
3. For members of stock exchange: securities companies: Chinese wall has to be erected to 
distinguish the brokerage department, underwriting department and credit business. And this must be 
notified to the clients. 
(Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, 1994) 
Section 7. IRELAND  
In the book Insider Trading in Western Europe: Current Status, Gerhard Wegen and 
Heinz-Dieter Assmann have mentioned that Ireland law makers not only concern in setting 
regulations of insider trading or penalizing violators, they also equip stock market participants with 
general legal knowledge through Irish Association of Investment Managers. Irish Association of 
Investment Managers (IAIM) is established to publish the Code of Best Practice for participants in 
the Stock Market such as companies, investors, analysts, stock brokers and advisers. This Code will 
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ensure participants the confidence that others do not have unfair information and Irish market is a 
fair and informed one, to facilitate the full compliance by participants in the market.   
 
The IAIM will provide: 
- Guidelines for the release of information to analysts: recommend them not to meet issuers 
during sensitive periods 
- Guideline for the persons who come into possession on unpublished price sensitive 
information should not deal or recommend other to deal until such information has been published  
- Guidelines to issuers: not to release unpublished price sensitive information to selective 
groups 
- Guidelines of definition of unpublished price sensitive information 
 
(Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, 1994) 
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CHAPTER 6. INEVITIBILITY FOR AN IMPVOMENT IN 
REGULATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING IN 
VIETNAM STOCK MARKET AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
While it is prohibited and judged as illegal and immoral issue in most of stock markets in the 
world (US, Britain, Japan, Ireland, France…), there have been several critics against those strict 
insider trading regulation and policies. Violating this prohibition can lead to such heavy penalties as 
imprisonment and fine payment, for example in France, insider trading defendant violator is imposed 
on liability ten times higher than the amount of profit he gained on inside information. And among 
well-known critic of policy on insider trading, Henry Manne is the ―most widely quoted” one. 
Manne‘s positive opinion on insider trading can be summarized into three key points (James R. 
Marsden and Y. Alex Tung, 1999):  
- Insider trading provides a meaningful form of compensation in large corporations for the 
entrepreneurial function; therefore it is an effective way of stimulating entrepreneurial activities;  
- Insider trading helps security prices adjust more rapidly to reflect underlying information, 
hence increasing market efficiency and resulting in more real investment; and,  
- Insider trading does no harm to outsiders. 
 
In their article ―The Use of Information System Technology to Test Insider Trading and 
Asymmetric Information‖ in 1999, Marsden and Alex Tung supported the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 points of 
Manne‘s argument based on results received from their laboratory experiments. The results of their 
second experiment concluded ―the fast dissemination of insider information indicating high market 
efficiency; and no significant difference between insiders' and outsiders' profits on insider 
information assets”. However, Douglas (1988) and Manove, M. (1989) significantly opposed 
Manne‘s argument and Manne‘s supporters by the evidence that: 
 - Insider trading is not a cost-effective mechanism for promoting market efficiency and is 
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no more effective than other compensation plans at producing the right incentive for entrepreneurial 
managers;  
 - Liquidity of markets will be reduced when insider trading is permitted; 
 -The inside information was intended for the benefit of the firm but not the private 
advantage of the traders; and, 
 - Outside investors will invest less because the market is "unfair."  
 
Taking Vietnam stock market‘s situation into consideration, I strongly believe that any public 
investor (or outsider), who is uninformed will stand on Douglas (1988) and Manove (1989)‘s sides. 
The results of conducted survey on how serious asymmetric information and insider trading 
violations are in Vietnam stock market conclude that inside information and inside trading exist for 
the sake of informed investors only, in this case are either wealthy VIP investors or those who have 
exceptionally close relationship with brokerage firms. Since 2006, role of the stock market as an 
effective capital mobilizing channel has become much more crucial for the Vietnam‘s economy 
when market capitalization accounts for 35-42% of Vietnam GDP on average. However, stock 
market simultaneously shows substantial flaws on its regulating and operating activities. From 2008- 
right after the global financial crisis occurrence and also the plummet of Vietnam stock market, the 
increasing number of insider trading cases and information disclosing violations (mainly from 
insiders and large shareholders) has caught the public attention. Gradually it has also been eroding 
investors‘ confidence in the transparency of the market. And a financial market can be smoothly 
operated or not depends on whether public confidence and investors‘ trust are maintained (Harry Mc 
Vea, 1993). Former chapters of this paper have pointed out causes leading to current severe 
asymmetric information level and insider trading in Vietnam stock market, among which insider 
regulation‘s imperfection comprising a major part: ―Lack of Effective Regulation Framework and 
Law Implementation on Insider Trading- Vague Regulation on Prohibition of Omission of 
Information and Misinformation-Imbalance between incentive and penalty execution in stock market 
and Incompetent and Backward Technology of Information Disclosing and Trading Supervision 
 50 
System‖. For insider trading can endanger investors‘ confidence in the fairness of capital markets 
and has a ―detrimental effect on them‖, it is inevitable for Vietnamese law makers to revise and 
improve insider regulations as well as information disclosure system in respect of individual investor 
protection and in respect of the functional protection of capital markets and the economy as a whole 
(Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, 1994). In the current complicated situation of Vietnam 
stock market, where public investors‘ equality of information access is not guaranteed; conflicts of 
interests between broker firms and their clients is not concerned and minority investors is misled by 
large shareholders‘ misinformation, it is prerequisite to re-examine and upgrade the enforcement of 
securities regulations. My recommendations for the sake of a more transparent and effective stock 
market are relied on firstly the analysis of asymmetric information and insider trading causes and 
secondly, on the lessons learnt from other developed stocks markets‘ solutions. Hence, the 
recommendations will focus on two key aspects: tightening regulation and improvement of 
disclosure information system.  
Section 1. IMPOSING HEAVIER PENALTIES 
Solving (or at least reducing) insider trading violations problem requires the law to be 
improved in regard to penalties and enforcement at national level (Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter 
Assmann, 1994). These two professors had also proved that ―penalties must be adequate deterrents 
and they should be both a prison and a fine‖ in order to prevent people from trading with inside 
information. Examining Germany, Swiss and Japan‘s back ground of stricter provisions; we can see 
that heavier penalties are adequate and inevitable in insider trading regulations in Vietnam stock 
market. Before 1988 and 1989, both Germany and Japan applied self-imposed and voluntary rules on 
insider trading. However, it became evident that Germany was more isolated at international level 
and its competitiveness of a financial center was negatively affected due to that insider trading rules 
and a statutory approach to the problem became inevitable (Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter 
Assmann, 1994). In Japan, before the enactment of new stricter regulations on insider trading, very 
few cases were punished by provision; and increasing widely-publicized scandals were caught by 
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public attention. To guarantee for the fairness of the securities market, Japanese law makers 
promulgated insider trading conduct subject to criminal sanction (Kazumi Okamura, Chieko 
Takeshita, 1989). Japanese securities law says: 
 “Any person who violates the provisions of Article 190-2 or Article 190-3
34
 is subject to 
imprisonment with the requirement of labor for not more than six months and/or a fine of not more 
than five hundred thousand yen” 
Similarly, prior to the enforcement of Article 161 of the SCC
35
, Swiss considered insider 
trading to be merely immoral issue and such a violation like that was punished on the moral level. 
However, under the pressure of global stock exchange and also the need to ensure Swiss‘ stock 
exchange reputation, Swiss promulgated Article 161 with stricter provisions on insider trading 
violations (Gerhard Wegen and Heinz-Dieter Assmann, 1994).  
Back to Vietnam stock market situation, it can damage its reputation as of the most effective 
and essential capital mobilizing channel for the economy by the perception that it lacked an 
incredible system on insider trading regulation. Additionally, reinforcing stricter provisions also got 
encouraged by the public in Vietnam stock market at the current time. In a conference on : 
―Improving Vietnam stock market‖ organized by Law University in Hochiminh City, Vietnam in 
July 2010, The Deputy Director of Research and Development of Hochiminh Stock Exchange-Mr. 
Le Chi Thu Khoa expressed his view on stock trading environment: ―Not only listed companies‘ 
CEOs, or Directors of Management Board, their relatives, but also brokers can conduct insider 
trading. This can bring an enormous profit to illegal traders immediately. Therefore, it is necessary to 
revise and to supplement insider trading law as well as to establish a separate court specializing in 
judge these crimes‖.
36
 
For all reasons, insider trading regulations should be adjusted and upgraded comprising the 
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three following elements: inside information, insiders, price manipulation and penalties
37
. Effective 
and comprehensible regulations on insider trading and price manipulation are also in need. These 
can helpful device for authorized agent to supervise and discover related violations on the market. 
Section 2. ENFORCING INTERNAL CONTROL, RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND 
CHINESE WALL IN SECURITIES FIRMS- REDUCING THE NUMBER OF SECURITIES 
COMPANIES 
Self-trading has become an important and key business activity for major number of 
securities companies in Vietnam when its revenue accounts for more than 50% of one‘s total revenue 
structure. In some cases, this percentage can reach to 80%. Holding such a crucial role, self-trading 
department is the center of a securities company, which receives all of the supports from other 
departments: brokerage, analysis, and advisory department. There are cases that analyzing reports of 
certain shares conducted by analysis department for the sake of clients‘ investment assistance, but 
turn to be a method for price manipulation violations. Self-trading department is an information hub, 
to which any information obtained by other departments, especially advisory department with inside 
information. At the present time, there are calls from public for a separation of self-trading from 
securities firm to guarantee of no conflicts of interests among the clients and the firm itself. And 
Saigon Securities Company (the 2
nd
 top securities in Vietnam market) is pioneer in dismissing its 
trading department and establishing a separate investment fund. In my opinion, applying Chinese 
Wall and reinforcing serious internal control system should be an adequate solutions for reconciling 
conflicting and potentially conflicting obligations under the general law. According to Harry Mc Vea 
(1993), Chinese Wall had been accepted officially by US and UK with many merits especially 
suitable in deregulation scene and it was proved by SEC that Chinese Wall ensured the fair treatment 
of customers and at some extent to solve the conflicts of interests.    
Vietnam securities law makers should also concern the current number of securities 
companies on the market. That more than one hundred companies in an emerging stock market, 
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insider trading violations as criminal sanction and this law would be valid from May, 2011 
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where top 20 companies account for more than 80% of the total market share, evidently leads to 
unhealthy competition. Improvement of the quality of securities companies should be in market 
controlling agents‘ priority rather than the quantity. Small companies with out-dated technology, low 
registered capital, and disqualified human resources should be dismissed from the market.  
Section 3. REINFORCING SHORT-SWING TRADING REGULATION AND 
DISCLOSING REQUIREMENTS  
Benefiting from ambiguous regulations on ―Misinformation and Omission of Information‖, 
large shareholders mislead other public investors by announcing their purchase and sale plan of 
certain shares at the same time. Yet, in fact, only their sale orders have been quietly executed. Or in 
some cases, large shareholders carried out sale order without announcing to SEC or public media. 
For these reason, short-swing trading regulation should be tightened to prohibit large shareholders 
from buying and selling the same stock at the same time.   
To reduce the leak of inside information, especially after the General Shareholders Meetings, 
besides upgrading information disclosure system, the time of information submission to SEC should 
be shorten to within 24 hours. Shortening the time will help lowering the opportunities for insiders to 
conduct insider trading.  
Section 4. UPGRADING DISCLOSING INFORMATION SYSTEM  
Hochiminh and Hanoi Stock Exchanges should have significant efforts and determination in 
reorganizing their information disclosure systems. Evidently, they must have a clear requirements 
and supervision procedure to control the quality and the time of disclosed information. A united 
disclosing system with adequate and rich information, files and filings of all listed as well as other 
public companies (IPOs). EDGAR (US) and EDINET (Japan) systems are excellent samples that 
Vietnam information disclosure controlling agents should learn from. An effective disclosing system 
can assure the fair and equal information accessibility for all public investors. This will prevent the 
current trend, in which information is only for the wealthy and close-to-brokers investors.  
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION- SUMMARY  
Asymmetric information and insider trading are controversial and popular researched topics 
in other developed markets. Yet, it is a not a case in Vietnam stock market. When VNIndex (Vietnam 
Stock Index) soared up to its peak record of 1,170 points at the end of 2006 and wandered around 
this level until early 2008, investors had complacency to enjoy their gains from their investment that 
tended to forget and/or ignore the existence and consequences of a severe asymmetric information 
and insider trading in the market. However, since VNIndex plummeted to its bottom at 200s points 
after the global financial crisis in 2008, with increasing number of violations related to insider 
trading, price manipulation, large shareholders‘ misinformation disclosure; the public started 
realizing the weaknesses and problems of the market. With primary data received from a survey and 
other information obtained from comparative analysis approach, this research has explored four 
major causes leading to Vietnam current severe asymmetric information problem: (1) lack of 
effective regulation framework and law implementation on insider trading, (2) vague regulation on 
prohibition of omission of information and misinformation, (3) imbalance between incentive and 
penalty execution in stock market and (4) incompetent and backward technology of information 
disclosing and trading supervision system. Three of out four explored causes are directly regarding 
to ―a lack of an incredible securities regulation system‖ in Vietnam stock market, in which insider 
trading law caught the most concern. Vietnam stock market can damage its reputation as the most 
important capital mobilizing channel for the while economy if unequal information accessibility 
continues eroding public confidence on stock market. With an effort to raise a flag to Vietnamese 
securities law makers and market controlling agents, this paper also aims to give some 
recommendations, which is are learnt from other developed and transparent stock markets in the 
world such as United States, Japan, Britain, France, Swiss, and Germany for an improvement in 
regulations and operation system. The following points are concerned and believed to be practical 
and constructive for Vietnam stock market: 
(1) imposing heavier penalties 
 55 
(2) enforcing internal control, risk management system and Chinese wall in 
securities firms- reducing the number of securities companies 
(3) reinforcing short-swing trading regulation and disclosing requirements 
(4) upgrading disclosure information system 
 
Immediate tightening regulations and perfect changes in information dislosure information is 
not expected to be carried out instantaneously.  However, regulations must be reexamined; quality 
of information disclosure system must be reevaluted in a comprehensive and serious manner, and 
actions must be taken with the ultimate goal to assure for the fairness trading of Vietnam stock 
market.  
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APPENDIXES 
SURVEY 
 
Attendant number: --      
1 Age        
2 Occupation 
3 Which securities company you open trading account with? 
4 What are reasons you choose that securities company?  
5 How much is your trading capital? 
6 How frequent have you been trading on average? per week/ per month 
7 
Which factors you concern the most when decide to purchase or sell or hold 
a certain stock? 
8 How can you get information of your interested stocks?  
9 
How frequent you can receive information through reports from securities 
companies? 
11 How can you get updated with the lasted information of a certain stock?  
10 
Among information of listed companies, which information is most 
important? 
12 Do you think information publicized by stock exchanges is updated?  
13 
Do you think information publicized by stock exchanges is important for 
you to make investment decision?  
14 
Among information sources you get updates, which one is the most 
important one? 
FIGURES 
Figure 01. Key development indicators for the STC over the period 2000–2005 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of listed companies 5 10 20 23 26 32 
Market capitalization (bil. VND) 1048.76 1661.1 2650.2 2514.29 3945.31 6337.48 
Market capitalization on GDP (%) 0.24 0.34 0.49 0.42 0.55  na 
Yearly trading value (bil. VND) 91.40  925.38 762.77 422.50  1692.99 2435.64 
Trading value on GDP (%) 0.02 0.19 0.14 0.07 0.24  na 
Aver. daily trading value (bil. VND) 1.39 6.13 3.23 1.71 6.8 9.82 
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Figure 02. Foreign investors trading value (VND billion) 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BUY 5,322 52,203 25,325 33,980 33,372 
SELL 1,244 29,329 19,498 30,655 22,242 
 
Figure 03: VNIndex from July 2000 to July 2010 
 
 
Figure 04. Theoretical information flow in Vietnam stock market 
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Figure 05. Types of survey attendants 
 
 
Figure 06. Information flow in case of Vietnam stock market in reality 
 
 
Figure 07: Means of exchanging inside information 
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Figure 08. Investors‘ perception on SEC‘s disclosed information 
 
 
Figure 09: Number is securities companies 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Information exchange among departments in a securities company in Vietnam 
 
 
 
